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THIRTEENTH ANNUAL GROTIUS LECTURE
SERIES
THE GLOBAL STATUS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS*
AMARTYA SEN**

1
I feel very honored to have the opportunity to give the Grotius
Lecture at this august forum. I cannot claim to be a legal scholar, with
any expertise on international law, and I cannot hide my sense of
inadequacy in giving this lecture in the name of one of the pioneering
thinkers on law in general and international law in particular. But I take
some encouragement from the fact that the great Hugo Grotius showed
in his own trail-blazing work a deep interest in linking legal thinking to
other disciplines of human thought. He was particularly partial to
poetry, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau noted when comparing Grotius’
ideas with those of Thomas Hobbes. In his book Emile, Rousseau even
went on to say, ―The truth is that their [Hobbes’ and Grotius’]
principles are exactly alike. They differ only in their manner of
expression. They also differ in method. Hobbes bases himself on
sophisms, and Grotius on poets. They have everything else in
common.‖1
It can be argued that Grotius had a noticeable passion for linking up
different disciplines of human reasoning, as many of his arguments
* Delivered to the 105th Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law, Thirteenth Annual Grotius Lecture Series, Washington, DC,
March 23, 2011.
** Thomas W. Lamont University Professor, and Professor of Economics and
Philosophy, Harvard University.
1. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE: OR ON EDUCATION 458 (Allan Bloom
trans., Basic Books 1979).
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make good use of what appears reasonable in common human thought.
Indeed, the idea that the sea is a shared territory, which all are free to
use—an idea that Grotius discussed in his book The Free Sea2 with
powerful appeal to the common understanding of reasonableness—
provides a general view of political normativity that is not parasitic on
legislated law by one nation or another.
I intend to take that as a point of departure, since the idea of human
rights makes a similar appeal to the political normativity of rights that
all human beings are supposed to have. That, to be sure, is not Grotius’
claim, but there is clearly a strong analogy here. At least one of the
concepts of human rights—one which I would like to pursue in this
lecture – shares with Grotius’ ideas (including the argument for the
shared freedom of the sea), the understanding that certain basic
entitlements come not from specific national legislation, but from the
recognition that these freedoms (to which people in general could be
taken to be entitled) come from general appreciation of normativity,
rather than any specific territorial legislation.
The global status of human rights can be seen in a similar normative
perspective. There are still many issues to sort out in pursuing this line
of thought, since it is a complicated claim, which can be resisted in
many different ways. To defend that approach we have to address
several points of reasoned resistance to the idea of human rights that
have been quite powerful in practice, and they demand reasoned
examination and scrutiny. To give the idea its due, we have to examine
in particular what is entailed by the recognition that some specific
claim should count as a human right.
But how should we think about the basis of human rights? What is
the nature of the discipline of human rights, which can give the claims
of these rights plausibility? These are questions that I want to address
in this talk.3

2
How, then, does the idea of human rights relate to law? It is not
surprising that there is a strong temptation to link human rights to law.
2. HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA (David Armitage ed., Richard Hakluyt
trans., Liberty Fund 2004).
3. See generally Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315 (2004); AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009).
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While the idea of human rights is of comparatively recent origin, the
concept of legal rights is old, well established, and widely used. Also,
the language of human rights is clearly influenced by legal
terminology. Furthermore, those who fight for human rights work often
enough to promote fresh legislation in that direction.
Before proceeding further, I must provide a clarification. The
rhetoric of human rights is sometimes applied to particular legislation
inspired by the idea of human rights. There is clearly no great difficulty
in seeing the obvious juridical status of these already legalized
entitlements. No matter what they are called (―human rights laws‖ or
whatever), they stand shoulder-to-shoulder with other established
legislation. There is nothing particularly complicated about this bit of
understanding.
But that can hardly be the whole story. For one thing, prior diagnosis
of the importance of some rights—unlegislated ―human rights‖—
clearly plays an important part in motivating so-called ―human rights
legislation.‖ Indeed, a great many acts of legislation and legal
conventions (such as the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms4) have been inspired by a
belief in some pre-existing rights of all human beings. There are
important issues about the status and standing of human rights before
any legislation aimed to give force to those rights actually occurs.5
When Christabel Pankhurst asserted in a speech in London in 1911:
―we are here to claim our right as women, not only to be free, but to
fight for freedom,‖ adding that this is ―our right as well as our duty,‖
she communicated a strong normative claim that was not yet legislated
into British law. Women did not have the right to vote in Britain in
1911, nor would that right be achieved until 1928, seventeen years after
Pankhurst’s speech (women would start voting the following year,
1929). The suffragist agitation, of which Christabel Pankhurst was a
major leader, and the related discussion on women’s normative ―right‖
4. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
5. There is an analogy here with Grotius' motivational discussion of the freedom
of the sea, including his early articulations on the rights of all on the high sea, which
came in the context of the Dutch seizure of the Portuguese ship Santa Catarina in
1603. This motivational analysis later led to Grotius' formulation of his theory of
international law, and the particular enunciation of THE FREE SEA. See generally
GROTIUS, supra note 2.
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to vote, would materially help in the process leading to the actual
legislation to give women the same voting rights as men in Britain
already had.
Furthermore, we must also examine whether legislation is the
only—or even the pre-eminent—route through which accepted human
rights can be made effective. This and other pertinent questions must
take us well beyond the temptation to confine the use of human rights
to the limits of what has already been legislated, no matter what they
are called.
However, the relationship between law and human rights does
require a closer examination. I shall distinguish between three different
types of connections, in particular that human rights are (1) post-legal,
(2) proto-legal, or (3) ideal-legal. I would argue that while each of
these connections can be contingently important, they fail both
individually and jointly to do justice to the nature and use of human
rights. We need to see global human rights, I would argue, over a much
bigger arena, of which legal motivation, actual legislation, and judicial
enforcement form only one part.
More particularly, I would argue that human rights are best seen as
normative articulations of social ethics comparable to, yet very
different from, utilitarian ethics. Like other ethical tenets, claims of
human rights can, of course, be disputed, but the belief that animates
the appeal of human rights is that they will survive open, informed, and
reasoned scrutiny. Any universality that these claims have is dependent
on the opportunity of unobstructed reasoning. 6

3
These questions are not new. Debates on this subject have occurred
for more than two hundred years. The American Declaration of
Independence took it to be ―self-evident‖ that everyone is ―endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable rights,‖ and thirteen years later, in
1789, the French declaration of ―the rights of man‖ asserted that ―men
are born and remain free and equal in rights.‖ But Jeremy Bentham did
not wait long, in his Anarchical Fallacies7 written during 1791-92
6. See generally SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 3 (discussing this issue
more fully).
7. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the
Declarations of Rights Issued During the French Revolution (1792), reprinted in 2
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(aimed against the French ―rights of man‖), to propose the total
dismissal of all such claims. Bentham insisted that ―NATURAL RIGHTS is
simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical
nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts.‖8 That dichotomy remains very alive
today, and despite persistent use of the idea of human rights in worldly
affairs, there are many who see the idea of human rights as no more
than ―bawling upon paper‖—to use another of Bentham’s mocking
portrayals of natural right claims, such as the French ―rights of man.‖
However, if we recognize articulation of human rights as non-legal
(or pre-legal) ethical claims, social demands linked to the so-called
―rights of man‖ are no more nonsensical than Bentham’s own
utilitarian pronouncements. Indeed, the analogy between the status of
utilitarian propositions and that of articulations of human rights has
considerable perspicacity, even though Bentham, the great founder of
modern utilitarianism, managed to overlook that connection altogether
in his classic hatchet job on natural rights in general and on the ―rights
of man‖ in particular. Bentham took the appropriate comparison to be,
specifically, between the legal significance of, respectively: (1)
declarations of human rights, and (2) actually legislated rights. Not
surprisingly, he found the former to be lacking in legal status in the
way that the latter clearly had. Bentham’s dismissal of human rights
came, thus, with amazing simplicity. ―Right, the substantive right, is
the child of law: from real laws come real rights; but from imaginary
laws, from laws of nature . . . come imaginary rights . . . .‖9
It is easy to see that Bentham’s rejection of the idea of natural ―rights
of man‖ depends substantially on the rhetoric of the privileged use of
the term of ―rights,‖ seeing it in its specifically legal interpretation.
However, insofar as human rights are taken to be significant ethical
claims, the fact that they do not necessarily have legal or institutional
force, at least not yet, is obvious enough, but altogether irrelevant. The
appropriate comparison is, surely, between: (1) a utility-based ethics
(championed by Bentham himself), which sees fundamental ethical
importance in utilities but none in human rights, and (2) an ethics that
makes room for the normative significance of human rights (as the
Volumes THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh,
William Tait 1843).
8. Id. at 501.
9. Id. at 523.

6

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[27:1

advocates of ―rights of man‖ did), linked with the basic importance of
human freedoms (and, related to that, of the corresponding social
responsibilities).
Just as utilitarian ethical reasoning takes the form of insisting that
utilities of the relevant persons must be taken into account in deciding
what should be done, the human rights approach demands that the
importance of the freedoms, incorporated as human rights, must be
given normative recognition. In fact, even as Bentham was busy
writing down his dismissal of ―rights of man‖ in 1791-92, the reach
and range of ethical interpretations of rights were being powerfully
explored in Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man, and in Mary
Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: with Strictures
on Political and Moral Subjects, both published during 1791-92
(though neither work seemed to arouse Bentham’s curiosity).10
If human rights are not just post-legal, what about the possibility that
they are proto-legal? In fact, however, an ethical understanding of
human rights goes not only against seeing them as legal demands (and
against taking them to be, as in Bentham’s view, legal pretensions); but
it also differs from a law-centered approach to human rights which sees
them as if they are basically grounds for law, and almost ―laws in
waiting.‖ Ethical and legal rights do, of course, have motivational
connections. In a rightly celebrated essay ARE THERE ANY NATURAL
RIGHTS? Herbert Hart, one of the leading experts on jurisprudence in
the twentieth century, has argued that people ―speak of their moral
rights mainly when advocating their incorporation in a legal system.‖11
Whereas Bentham saw rights as a ―child of law,‖ Hart’s view takes the
form, in effect, of seeing some natural rights as parents of law: they
motivate and inspire specific legislation.
There is an interesting question of territorial variations in the
identification of human rights that can co-exist with the shared global
status of the idea of human rights. The claim of human rights need not
10. Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke's Attack on
the French Revolution, in THE RIGHTS OF MAN PART I (Woodstock Books 1992
(1791); Thomas Paine, Rights of Man Part the Second Combining Principle and
Practice (1792), reprinted in RIGHTS OF MAN, COMMONSENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL
WRITINGS 192 (Mark Philip ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995); MARY
WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN (Alfred A. KnopF
1992) (1792).
11. H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 177 (1955).
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take the form that this is ideally legislated into the statute book
everywhere as this is a ―natural right,‖ since the appropriateness of
legislation may strongly depend on contingent social circumstance—
the demand need not have much to do with what calls for legislation in
some imagined ―state of nature.‖ For example, if some residents are
excluded from being covered by social security or from having a statesponsored medical insurance that others, in similar circumstances,
already have in the existing institutional structure, the moral and
political demand in contention has to be seen in the specific context of
the institutional arrangements that exist in that society, from which
some are unjustifiably excluded. The issue of discrimination given the
existing national arrangements is also directly involved, for example, in
Christabel Pankhurst’s demand that women too should have voting
rights since men already had such rights. As John Tasioulas argued in
an illuminating essay called THE MORAL REALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
―human rights enjoy a temporally constrained form of universality, so
that the question of which human rights exist can only be answered
within some specific historical context.‖12
Herbert Hart was not, in fact, arguing that the ground for something
to be legislated into a statute book is that it is in some pre-existing
sense a ―natural right,‖ but rather that ―advocating their incorporation
in a legal system‖ can be the content of something being seen as a
―natural right‖ or a ―moral right.‖13 Hart argues that the meaning of
―rights‖ in the moral sense includes this interpretation of the word. The
precise ground for such advocacy is a separate issue from the existence
of such a moral claim.
There can be little doubt that the idea of moral rights can serve—and
has often served in practice—as the basis of new legislation. It has
frequently been utilized in this way, and this is indeed an important use
of human rights. That, for example, is precisely the way the diagnosis
of inalienable rights was invoked in the American Declaration of
Independence and reflected in the subsequent U.S. legislation
(including the Amendments), a route that has been well-trodden in the
legislative history of many countries in the world, perhaps most
12. John Tasioulas, The Moral Reality of Human Rights, in FREEDOM FROM
POVERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT: WHO OWES WHAT TO THE VERY POOR? 75, 76
(Thomas Pogge ed., 2007).
13. See generally Hart, supra note 13.
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famously in the invitation of new legislation in the United Nations’
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (pioneered by Eleanor
Roosevelt). Providing inspiration for legislation is certainly one way in
which the ethical force of human rights have been constructively
deployed.

4
To acknowledge that such a connection exists is not the same thing
as taking the relevance of human rights to lie exclusively in their
playing an inspirational or justificatory role for actual legislation. It is
important to see that the idea of human rights can be, and is actually,
used in several other ways. It is easy to appreciate that if human rights
are seen as powerful moral claims—indeed as ―moral rights‖ (to use
Hart’s phrase)—then surely we have reason for some catholicity in
considering different avenues for promoting these claims. Thus, the
ways and means of advancing the ethics of human rights need not be
confined only to making new laws. For example, social monitoring and
other activist support provided by such organizations as Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International, OXFAM, Médecins sans Frontières,
Save the Children, Red Cross, or Action Aid (to consider many
different types of NGOs) can themselves help to advance the effective
reach of acknowledged human rights. In many contexts, legislation
may not, in fact, be at all involved. Public exposure and condemnation
can have a huge role in preventing violations of what are widely
acknowledged to be moral rights of others.
Legislation can, of course, often be an effective way of promoting or
protecting the freedoms underlying human rights. Many actual laws
have been enacted by individual states, or by associations of states,
which gave legal force to certain rights seen as basic human rights. The
point is not so much whether the legislative route can make the social
ethics of human rights more effective. It certainly can do this in many
cases. The point, rather, is that there are other routes as well, which
help to make the ethics of human rights more influential and effective.
I have argued so far against seeing human rights only as
consequences of appropriate legislation, or only as motivation for
making such legislation. But what about the view, which has
sometimes been aired, that human rights are best seen as ideals for
legislation? This raises an interesting question about the appropriate
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reach of the legislative route. Would it be reasonable to claim that if a
human right is seen as important, then it must be ideal to legislate it
into a precisely specified legal right?
I resist this proposal. For some rights, the ideal route may not be
legislation, but something else, such as recognition or agitation, or even
public discussion and education, with the hope to changing the
behavior of those who contribute to the violation of human rights. For
example, recognizing and defending a wife’s moral right to be
consulted in family decisions, even in a traditionally sexist society,
may well be extremely important.14 And yet it seems entirely plausible
that coercive legislation, with the imprisoning or fining of husbands for
ignoring the views of their wives, may be much too blunt a way of
ensuring that husbands consult their wives in family decisions. Because
of the importance of communication, advocacy, exposure, and
informed public discussion, human rights can have influence without
necessarily depending on coercive legal rules. For example, Mary
Wollstonecraft explored many different types of social change through
which what she called ―the vindication of the rights of woman‖ could
be advanced.15 That eighteenth-century insight remains relevant today.

5
I turn now to the questions regarding the form and basis of
normativity that underlies human rights and their global status, without
any existing legislation, or even without there being a corresponding
claim of what should be ideally legislated. A pronouncement of human
rights is an assertion of the importance of the corresponding freedoms
that are identified and privileged in the formulation of the rights in
question. For example, the human right of not being tortured springs
from the importance of freedom from torture for all. This goes with the
affirmation of the need for others to consider what they can reasonably
do to secure the freedom from torture for all. For a would-be torturer,
the demand is obviously quite straightforward, to refrain and desist.
The demand takes the clear form of what Immanuel Kant called a
―perfect duty.‖16 However, for others too (that is, those other than the
14. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 189-203 (2000).
15. See, e.g., WOLLSTONECRAFT, supra note 12.
16. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 58, 130 (Mary J.
Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1788).
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would-be torturers) there are responsibilities, even though they are less
specific and come in the general form of ―imperfect obligations‖ (to
invoke another Kantian concept). Imperfect obligations are the general
duties of anyone in a position to help to consider what he or she can
reasonably do in the matter involved. The perfectly specified demand
not to torture anyone is supplemented by the more general—and less
exactly specified—requirement to consider the ways and means
through which torture can be prevented and then to decide what, if
anything, one should reasonably do in any particular case.
It is important to emphasize that the recognition of human rights is
not an insistence that everyone everywhere must rise to help prevent
every violation of every human right no matter where it occurs. It is,
rather, an acknowledgement that if one is in a plausible position to do
something effective in preventing the violation of such a right, then one
does have an obligation to consider doing just that. It is still possible
that other obligations or non-obligational concerns may overwhelm the
reason for the particular action in question, but that reason cannot be
simply brushed away as being ―none of one’s business.‖ Imperfect
obligations must not be confused with no obligations at all.
It is useful to illustrate, with a concrete example, the distinction
between different kinds of obligations—an illustration that I have
discussed more fully in The Idea of Justice.17 Consider a real-life case
that occurred in Queens, New York in 1964, when a woman, Kitty
Genovese, was fatally assaulted in full view of others watching the
event from their apartments, who did nothing to help her.18 It is
plausible to argue that three terrible things happened here, which are
distinct but interrelated:
(1) Genovese’s freedom, and right, not to be assaulted was violated
(clearly the primary nastiness in this case was that Kitty Genovese was
murdered);
(2) the murderer violated the immunity that anyone should have
against assault and killing (a violation of a ―perfect obligation‖); and
(3) the others who did nothing whatsoever to help the victim also
transgressed their general, and ―imperfect,‖ obligation to help which
17. See SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 372-79.
18. See Martin Gansburg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn't Call the Police, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1964, at 1.
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they could reasonably be expected to provide.
These distinct failings bring out a complex pattern of rights-duties
correspondence in a reasoned ethics.
Imperfect obligations, along with the inescapable ambiguities
involved in that idea, can be avoided only if the rest of humanity (other
than those directly involved) are exempted from any responsibility to
try to do what they reasonably can to help. While that kind of general
immunity—from having to do anything for others—might seem
reasonable enough as far as legal requirements are concerned, the case
for such impunity in the ethical domain would be hard to justify. As it
happens, however, in the laws of some countries, there is even a legal
demand, which can hardly have extreme precision, for providing
reasonable help to third parties. For example, in France there is
provision for ―criminal liability of omissions‖ in the failure to provide
reasonable help to others suffering from particular types of
transgressions. Not surprisingly ambiguities in the application of such
laws have proved to be quite large and have been the subject of
considerable legal disputation.19 The ambiguity of duties of this type,
whether in ethics or in law, would be difficult to avoid if third-party
obligations of others in general are given some room, and this cannot
be avoided for an adequate theory of human rights.
Even though recognitions of human rights (with their associated
claims and obligations) are ethical affirmations, they need not, by
themselves, deliver a complete blueprint for evaluative assessment. An
agreement on human rights does involve a firm commitment to give
reasonable consideration to the duties that follow from that ethical
endorsement. But even with agreement on these affirmations, there can
still be serious debates, particularly in the case of imperfect obligations,
on (i) how the attention that is owed to human rights should be best
paid, (ii) how the different types of human rights should be weighed
against each other, given the limits of one’s time and opportunity, (iii)
how the claims of human rights should be consolidated with other
evaluative concerns that may also deserve ethical attention, and so on.
19. On this see Andrew Ashworth and Eva Steiner, Criminal Omissions and
Public Duties: The French Experience, 10 LEGAL STUD. 153, 158 (1990), and
Glanville Williams, Criminal Omissions: The Conventional View, 107 L.Q. REV.
86, 91-93 (1991).
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A theory of human rights can leave room for further discussions,
disputations, and arguments. The approach of open public reasoning,
which is central to the understanding of human rights, can definitively
settle some disputes about coverage and content, but may have to leave
other possibilities unsettled, at least tentatively. The admissibility of a
domain of continued dispute—and this, in my judgment, is a very
important issue—is no embarrassment to a theory of human rights, for
that is the nature of the subject matter we are dealing with. As Aristotle
argued in the Nicomachean Ethics, we have ――to look for precision in
each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject
admits.‖. . . .‖20
In practical applications of human rights, such debates are, of course,
quite common and entirely customary, particularly among human
rights activists. What is being argued here is that the possibility of such
debates—without losing the basic recognition of the importance and
the global status of human rights—is not only a feature of what can be
called ―human rights practice,‖ but are actually part of the general
discipline of human rights (rather than being a defect of that discipline).
Variability of this kind within the normative discipline of human rights
is not only not an embarrassment, it is much like other ambiguities that
are standardly present in all general theories of substantive ethics.
Indeed, a similar diversity can be found within utility-centered ethics,
even though typically this feature of the large ethical discipline tends to
receive little or no recognition (it certainly received little discussion
from Jeremy Bentham himself).

6
I turn, finally, to the intellectual basis of human rights. What lies
behind the normative basis of human rights? How should we judge
whether and why to take them seriously? Any general plausibility that
these ethical claims, or denials thereof, have on this theory is dependent
on their survival and flourishing when they encounter unobstructed
discussion and scrutiny, along with adequately wide informational
availability. The connection between public reasoning and the
formulation and use of human rights is extremely important. The
soundness of the normativity of a claim for a human right would be
20. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS at 3 (William David Ross trans.,
Oxford University Press 1998).

2012]

GLOBAL STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

13

seriously undermined if it were possible to show that they are unlikely
to survive open public scrutiny. However, the case for human rights
cannot be discarded simply by pointing to the fact that in politically
and socially repressive regimes, which do not allow open public
discussion, many of these human rights are not taken seriously at all.
Open critical scrutiny—actual or imagined—is as essential for the
dismissal of a normative claim as it is for the defense of that claim.
So this, broadly outlined, is the theory of global human rights that I
am trying present here, and which I have discussed more fully in The
Idea of Justice.21 I should mention, before I end, that in presenting this
view I go part of the way with John Rawls, but not the whole way.
Rawls has argued powerfully that the objectivity of ethical and political
claims must be ultimately dependent on their survivability in
unobstructed discussion.22 That is a point of agreement. What I would
like to resist, however, is Rawls’ inclination, particularly in his later
works, to limit such public confrontation within the boundaries of each
particular nation (or each ―people,‖ as Rawls calls this regional
collectivity), for determining what would be just, at least in domestic
affairs.23 We can demand, on the contrary, that the discussion has to
include, if only to avoid local prejudices, views also from what Adam
Smith called in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, ―a certain distance.‖24
The role of open public reasoning, allowing global entry, in the
understanding and recognition of human rights links closely with
Adam Smith’s approach to jurisprudence. Smith was very concerned
about avoiding the biases of closeness and ethical myopia. Rather than
trying to cater only to the dominant views of ruling groups, Smith saw
the need to bring in perspectives from other groups, sects, and classes.
This was, for him, a principal way of transcending, among other
barriers, the limitations of class-based thinking—Smith was at least as
firm on that subject as Marx would later be—but Smith also used it to
assert the necessity of seeking global argumentative encounters, actual
or visualized, in checking the plausibility of normative claims.
One of Smith’s illustrations of parochial values that needed
21. SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 4.
22. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed.
1999); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) .
23. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLEs (Harvard Univ. Press 1999).
24. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 128 (Knud
Haakonssen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1759).
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confrontation with views from elsewhere refers to the tendency of all
political commentators in ancient Greece, including sophisticated
Athenians, to regard infanticide as perfectly acceptable social behavior.
Smith pointed out that even Plato and Aristotle did not depart from
expressing approval of this extraordinary practice which
―[u]ninterrupted custom had by this time so thoroughly authorized . . .‖
in ancient Greece.25
The significance of distant perspectives has clear relevance not only
to easily recognized nasty practices, such as the stoning of adulterous
women under the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, but also to some current
debates in the United States, including in the U.S. Supreme Court, as I
have discussed in my book The Idea of Justice26, in dealing, for
example, with arguments about the acceptability and the field of
applicability of capital punishment. What is relevant here is Smith’s
insistence that ―the eyes of the rest of mankind‖ must be invoked to
understand whether ―a punishment appears equitable.‖27 The necessity
of this arises, Smith argued, for the avoidance of bias related to either
individual or sectional interest, or local parochialism:
We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form
any judgment concerning them; unless we remove ourselves, as it were,
from our own natural station, and endeavour to view them as at a certain
distance from us. But we can do this in no other way than by
endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other
people are likely to view them.28

I end with what may appear to be a silly question. Rousseau
expressed the view, as I quoted earlier, that ―Hobbes bases himself on
sophisms, and Grotius on poets. They have everything else in
common.‖29 Was Rousseau right to claim that there is such a
congruence in the principles advocated by Thomas Hobbes and Hugo
25. Id. at 246.
26. SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra NOTE 4, at 404-06.
27. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 104 (R. L. Meek et al. eds.,
OXFORD UNIV. Clarendon Press 1978) (1762-63); Sen, The Idea of Justice, supra
note 4, AT 405.
28. The Smithian perspective on moral reasoning is further examined in SMITH,
THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 25, at 128. The Smithian
perspective on moral reasoning is pursued in my paper Amartya Sen, Open and
Closed Impartiality, 99 J. PHIL. 445, 451 (2002).
29. ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 458.
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Grotius? One difference seems to be this: Hobbes confined his
justificatory discussion to what happens within the borders of a
sovereign state. Indeed, that became the solid basis of the social
contract approach to the theory of justice, of which John Rawls’
powerful theory, with many sophistications that Hobbes had not
considered, is a direct descendent.
Grotius’ inclination seems to me to be different. He was looking for
reasoning that could, at least in its basic appeal, transcend the local
boundaries of a state. In this sense, I can claim to be more in line with
Grotius than with Hobbes. This diagnosis is not particularly relevant
for the plausibility of the argument I am trying to present here—my
justification is Smithian rather than Grotiusian—but it is interesting for
me to note that there is a similarity here with the great Grotius’ ideas, at
least up to a point. And that similarity, even if it ultimately proves to be
illusory, seems to me to be a good note on which to end this Grotius
lecture.

